

# **NIB ANNUAL REPORT 2018**

Ministry of transport and construction  
of the Slovak republic

SLOVAKIA



## **PREFACE TO THE REPORT**

In Slovak republic the Unit responsible for Investigation of Railway Accidents is an integral part of the Ministry of transport and construction of the Slovak republic. The Ministry is an investigation body in case of accidents and extraordinary events occurred on railroads. The aim of this unit is the investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents. This investigation leads to the development of the safety on railways.

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# **1 INTRODUCTION TO THE INVESTIGATION BODY**

## **1.1 Legal Basis (or Legal framework)**

In Slovakia the investigation of rail serious accidents, minor accidents and incidents is based on the EU Railway Safety Directive and on the national law 513/2009 Coll.

The investigating body shall investigate the causes of circumstance of serious accidents occurred in the railway infrastructure and affecting the safety of the system. The accident or extraordinary event investigations shall be without prejudice to the obligation of the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking to determine their causes in their own operation and among their own employees with the aim to take measures to prevent from the accident repeating or to improve globally the railway system safety. They shall inform the investigating body and the safety authority about taken measures.

## **1.2 Role and Aim**

The NIB in Slovak republic was founded in 1.1.2010, and the objective of investigation shall be accident prevention and options concerning the further improvement of the safety of the existing railway system and in no case the questions associated with apportioning blame or legal liability of particular persons.

## **1.3 Organisation**

NIB of Slovak republic is independent in its organisation and legal structure from any infrastructure manager, railway undertakings, bodies and other persons whose interests could conflict with the tasks entrusted to the investigating body. The Unit for Investigation of Railway Accidents is a structural unit at the Ministry of transport and construction of the Slovak republic set up by the Government of the Republic. The NIB has totaly 3 employees. All costs of the unit are covered from the budget of the Ministry of transport and construction of the Slovak republic. The Unit for Investigation of Railway Accidents does not have its own budget.

The employees who are responsible for investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents are members of Section of railways transport and railroads. The function of the national investigation body is performed by three employees of this section.

## **2 INVESTIGATION PROCESSES**

### **2.1 Cases to be investigated**

The investigating body shall investigate the causes of circumstance of serious accidents occurred in the railway infrastructure and affecting the safety of the system.

The investigating body shall investigate also the minor accident or the extraordinary event, including technical failures in the structural subsystems or components, which when repeating and under slightly different conditions might have led to serious accident. It shall take into account:

- a) the seriousness of the accident or extraordinary event,
- b) whether the accident or extraordinary event forms part of a series of events or a chain of associated events which might endanger the whole existing railway system,
- c) whether the accident or extraordinary event has an impact also on the safety of the European Community railway system, and
- d) requests and suggestions of the infrastructure manager, railway undertakings, the safety authority or authorities of the Member States.

The accident or extraordinary event investigations shall be without prejudice to the obligation of the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking to determine their causes in their own operation and among their own employees with the aim to take measures to prevent from the accident repeating or to improve globally the railway system safety. They shall inform the investigating body and the safety authority about taken measures.

### **2.2 Institutions involved in investigations**

The extent of investigations, the person of investigator or the composition of the investigation commission as well as the procedure to be followed in carrying out such investigations shall be determined by the investigating body, taking into account the objective and principles of the accident prevention and the lessons which may be used to improve the safety of the existing railway system

The investigation shall be conducted independently of any investigation carried out by the Police Corps or other body concerning the questions of the blame and liability of particular persons (hereinafter referred to as the "police inquiry") and of the investigation conducted by the infrastructure manager or the railway undertaking.

The police inquire executor may apply the investigating body for investigation of the case other than the accident in the railway infrastructure. The investigating body may satisfy this requirement if such an investigation does not endanger the investigation of a serious accident or the independence of its investigation. The same apply if the other state authority applies for investigation.

## **2.3 Investigation process or approach of the NIB**

The infrastructure manager and railway undertaking shall be obliged immediately after finding to report an accident or an extraordinary event to the coordination centre of Integrated Rescue System, the investigating body and the Railway Police; this shall not apply in case of an incident and an extraordinary event of the incident importance. An extraordinary event of the incident importance shall be report to the Railway Police only when it is results from the human activity.

The report pursuant to previous paragraph shall include all data necessary to start the rescue works in particular the site, time, type, consequences and other known circumstances.

The investigation shall mean a procedure prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information about the accident or the extraordinary event, the preparing the final report containing the conclusions and the determination of causes of the accident or the origin of an extraordinary event as well as the making of safety recommendations for the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking. The objective of investigation shall be accident prevention and options concerning the further improvement of the safety of the existing railway system and in no case the questions associated with apportioning blame or legal liability of particular persons.

The investigating body shall conclude its examinations at the accident site within the shortest possible time in order to enable the railway undertaking to remove damaged railway vehicle and the infrastructure manager to restore the infrastructure operation for the railway transport.

The investigating body shall be obliged to inform the European railway agency about the investigation beginning within one week of such beginning. Such information shall include the date, time and accident site, as well as its type and its consequences as regards the number of fatalities and injuries and extent of the damage.

### 3 INVESTIGATIONS

#### 3.1 Overview of investigations completed, identifying key trends

Type of accidents investigated	Number of accidents	Number of victims		Damages in € (approximation)	Trends in relation to previous years
		Deaths	Ser.Injur		
Level crossing accident	1	1	0	135 811,04	
SPAD	2	0	0	0	

#### 3.2 Investigations commenced in 2018

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
14. 11. 2018	SPAD	ii

**Basis for investigation:** i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

#### 3.3 Research studies (or Safety Studies) commissioned and completed in 2018

##### Safety Studies completed in 2018

Date of commission	Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis	Completed (date)
	none		

**Basis for investigation:** i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

##### Safety Studies commenced in 2018

Date of commission	Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
	none	

**Basis for investigation:** i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

#### 3.4 Summaries of investigations completed in 2018

NIB SK completed 3 investigations in 2018. It were investigated and closed 1 case which occurred in 2017 and started and closed another 2 cases occurred in 2018.

#### 3.5 Summaries of investigations commenced in 2018

One investigation accident commenced in 2018 and it were not closed and it is carried over to the next year.



### 3.6 Comment and introduction or background to the investigations

#### Investigations commenced in 2018 and not followed

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis	Reason of non following or suspension of investigations	Who, why, when (decision)
	none			

**Basis for investigation:** i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

### 3.7 Accidents and incidents investigated during last five years (in 2014–2018)

#### Rail investigations by NIB SK in 2014–2018

Accidents investigated		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	TOT
Serious accidents (Art 19, 1 + 2)	Train collision	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Train collision with an obstacle	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Train derailment	1	1	0	1	0	3
	Level-crossing accident	1	1	1	1	1	5
	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Fire in rolling stock	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Involving dangerous goods	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other accidents (Art 21.6)	Train collision	-	0	0	0	0	0
	Train collision with an obstacle	-	0	0	0	0	0
	Train derailment	-	0	0	0	0	0
	Level-crossing accident	-	0	0	0	0	0
	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	-	0	0	0	0	0
	Fire in rolling stock	-	0	0	0	0	0
	Involving dangerous goods	-	0	0	0	0	0
Incidents	-	3	0	1	2	6	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>

## 4 RECOMMENDATIONS

### 4.1 Short review and presentation of recommendations

NIB SK made recommendations which may be used to improve the safety of the existing railway system separately for each cause.

#### 4.2 Recommendations 2018

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation, Safety recommendations
19. 12. 2017	<p data-bbox="582 340 1342 405"><b>Level crossing accident: between stations Sládkovičovo and Senec</b></p> <p data-bbox="582 416 823 445">Addressee to NSA:</p> <ul data-bbox="582 454 1342 725" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="582 454 1342 622">• The NSA will examine the options to make the relevant regulations more flexible and their application so as to limit, as far as possible, the creation of additional level crossings and to make the process of their interference and substitution more efficient.</li> <li data-bbox="582 631 1342 725">• The NSA will assess the safety management system, the safety objectives and the IM security policy with regard to the need to reduce the number of level crossings.</li> </ul>
8. 1. 2018	<p data-bbox="582 743 927 772"><b>Spad: Krompachy station</b></p> <p data-bbox="582 781 823 810">Addressee to NSA:</p> <ul data-bbox="582 819 1366 981" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="582 819 1366 981">• The NSA will examine how the railway undertaking ensures that train drivers are informed of changes in the timetable and relevant regulations; How are checks drivers in this area as well as how many checks have been carried out with the railway undertaking in 2017</li> </ul>
16. 2. 2018	<p data-bbox="582 996 871 1025"><b>Spad: Trenčín station</b></p> <p data-bbox="582 1034 823 1064">Addressee to NSA:</p> <ul data-bbox="582 1072 1358 1169" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="582 1072 1358 1169">• The NSA will examine security management system of the ZSSK Cargo carrier and the method of driving trains by train drivers who are not the employees of the carrier.</li> </ul> <p data-bbox="582 1178 807 1207">Addressee to RU:</p> <ul data-bbox="582 1216 1334 1312" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="582 1216 1334 1312">• The ZSSK Cargo carrier will adjust the conditions for the carriage of its trains by train drivers who are not its employees</li> </ul>